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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PRIZE FIGHT STATUTES
By ELME ] . MILLION*
The hypothesis has been advanced elsewhere' that the
dominant opinion of a particular time and place with regard
to any described activity exercises a controlling influence not
merely upon the enactment of legislation and the attempted
prosecution of offenders, but also upon appellate decisions
which ostensibly are rendered solely according to principles of
procedure, proof, and constitutionality. In other words,
changes in this dominant opinion may cause concomitant
changes in the "constitutionality" of particular legislation,
and vary the interpretation placed upon statutory phrases.
The history of prize fight statutes and their interpretation
by the courts affords a clear illustration of the extent to which
changing conditions and changing attitudes affect the enforce-
ability of the criminal law. For this reason, and because the
cases dealing with prize fights are intrinsically interesting and
have thus far never been collected and treated by the law
writers, this particular study suggests itself.
Courts have differed as to whether prize-fighting was
indictable at common law2 or came into existence only with the
enactment of specific prohibitory legislation.3 The truth seems
to be a little of both views. While not eo womine an offense at
common law, prize fighting was nevertheless punishable as a
breach of the peace, assault and battery, riot, or some similar
offense. The term "prize-fighting" was originally applied to
many forms of encounters waged for reward, including those
in which the contestants used swords, staffs, or merely their
* A. B., Southwestern State Teachers' College (Okla.); LL. B. 1935,
University of Oklahoma; attended Yale University 1936-37. Assistant
professor of Law at Southern Methodist University 1937-38. Assist-
ant professor of Law at University of Idaho College of Law 1938-.1Million, Limitations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions (J. S. D.
Thesis, 1938. Yale law school library).2 Commonwealth v. Whitehead (Penn. 1839), 2 Law Rep. (0. S.)
148 (in 40 Cent. Dig., col. 2497).
'People, ex rel., Weiner v. Barr, 131 Misc. 80, 225 N. Y. Supp. 346
(1927) (reversed on another ground, 223 App. Div. 310, 228 N. Y.
Supp. 192). Coliseum Athletic Assn. v. Dillon, 204 Mo. App. 504,
223 S. W. 955 (1920).
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bare fists. 4 It was only gradually that the latter variation
became predominant, and also distinguishable from duelling on
the one hand, and ordinary fistic affrays on the other.5 It was
not until 1719 that England first recognized the existence of a
champion of the sport, in the person of James Figg. Because
of the relative modernity of the sport's rise to public notice, it
was not yet expressly outlawed by the English common law at
the time of American Independence, hence the illegality of such
conduct in America has arisen almost6 entirely from specific
statutes in the different states, quite independently of the scat-
tered decisions of the nineteenth century English courts.
These early fights, according to all reports, were often very
barbarous encounters in which there was no observance of any
rules. The London Prize Fight Rules, which purportedly were
followed, were themselves barbarous enough, permitting the
wearing of spiked shoes, the use of bare fists, and continued
rounds of fighting until one contender surrendered or fell to
rise no more. The fighters were a tough assortment, far
removed from modern Shakespearean lecturers, and often had
difficulty confining their fistic activities to the ring. The
character of many of the fight-followers was also objection-
able, and the fights themselves often took the form of riots
before the finish. In view of these facts, and the fact that the
enfranchised citizens were struggling to wrest a living and at
the same time curb ever recurrent lawlessness, it may be con-
ceded that the dominant force of American public opinion
stood behind those early statutes.
The Massachusetts courts, both in the days before and in
the years following the Civil War, upheld convictions for viola-
tions of the prize fighting statute7 despite a barrage of objec-
tions which other courts later professed to consider important.
The statute applied to all fights by previous appointment, and
4Ene. Brit. (11th ed. 1911), vol. xxii, p. 637.
5Many precedents relied upon by the courts actually involved
duelling or street fights. For instance, Adains v. Waggoner, 33 Ind.
531, 5 Am. Rep. 230 (1870), has been cited as holding prize fights
illegal. The case Involved a fight in which one of the contestants
stabbed his opponent three times with a knife. Several of the English
cases similarly cited involved duels.
'One of the few exceptions appears in State v. Burnham, 56 Vt.
445, 48 Am. Rep. 801 (1884), in which the court affirmed a conviction
of breach of the peace, arising from engagement in a boxing match.
Stat. (1849), c. 49, ss. 1, 2.
K. L. J.-3
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the court held that the absence of a prize, or the fact that the
actual bout was in another jurisdiction, or that a particular
defendant acted only as a second, would be no bar to a convic-
tion.8  In Commonwealth v. Welsh,9 the fight ended in a m~l~e
in which several persons attacked the until then victorious con-
tender and knocked him down. The conviction of a second of
one of the fighters was affirmed along with that of the fighter.
In Commonwealth v. Colberg,'0 the Massachusetts court in
1876 affirmed the conviction of two prize fighters on indictments
for assault and battery. The court ruled that:
"Prize-fighting, boxing matches, and encounters of that kind serve
no useful purpose, tend to breaches of the peace, and are unlawful
even when entered into by agreement and without anger or ill will."
An earlier Ohio decision thought to be contrary" was con-
demned as opposed to the weight of authority. In a number of
states the issue was raised as to what constituted a prize fight,
but it was held that the change from the London Prize Fight
Rules to the Marquis of Queensberry rules,12 the fact that the
contestants wore gloves, shook hands at the beginning of the
match, divided the prize money evenly,13 did not have an arena
roped off, and called the encounter by some other name, did not
avoid the statute.
In Seville v. State,' 4 the court upheld a conviction for prize
fighting where the bout was conducted under the Queensberry
rules, and approved the rejection by the trial court of an offer
of expert testimony to show that a difference existed between
"prize fighting" and "boxing".
In State v. Bumlum' 5 the Vermont court in 1884 affirmed
the conviction of two prize fighters charged with breaching the
peace. The lower court had refused to admit into evidence the
boxing gloves worn by the combatants, and the appellate court
8 Commonwealth v. Welsh, 73 Mass. 324 (1856); Commonwealth
v. Barrett, 108 Mass. 302 (1871).
'73 Mass. 324 (1856).
10 119 Mass. 350, 20 Am. Rep. 328 (1876).
IChamper v. State, 14 Ohio St. 437 (1863) (Memorandum opin-
ion; indicating a fist fight rather than a prize fight or prearranged
bout. Not contra to Collberg case.)
"Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 16 Wkly. Notes Cas. 14 (Penn. 1885)
(in 40 Cent. Dig., col. 2497).
"Commonwealth v. McGovern, 116 EKy. 212, 75 S. W. 261, 66 L. R. A.
280 (1903).
149 Ohio St. 117, 30 N. E. 621 (1892); Accord: State v. Olympic
Club, 46 La. Ann. 935, 15 So. 190 (1894).
1556 Vt. 445, 48 Am. Rep. 801 (1884).
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ruled that since the gloves furnished no criterion by which to
judge the character of the contest, their exclusion was harmless.
Foreshadowing similar distinctions made by the New York
courts in later years, the Vermont court remarked:
"It is true that sparring or boxing with gloves ... is not unlawful.
But such pugilistic exercise may be abused and carried beyond the
limits of healthful exercise and sport. It may create a breach of the
peace. It inay even degenerate into a prize fight.'' -"
As prize fighters became more proficient in their art, and
their porformances somewhat less impromptu, public interest
increased, and the difficulty of obtaining convictions increased
accordingly. It was John L. Sullivan, most colorful of them
all, upon whom public interest especially centered. Conse-
quently, the opinions in cases involving Sullivan are usur-
prizingly similar in result, if divergent in doctrine.
In Sullivan v. State,17 the Mississippi court in 1889 re-
viewed the conviction of Sullivan under the prize fighting stat-
ute of that state. The indictment, based on Sullivan's fight
with Kilrain, charged that Sullivan, on the date and at the
place named "did . . . by previous appointment
meet in a prize fight with Kilrain . . . for a large sum of
money . . and did . . in said ring, beat, strike
and bruise said Kilrain". In reversing the conviction, the
court found the indictment fatally defective in several re-
spects:
(1) It will not clearly specify the act which was made unlawful,
to the exclusion of other acts not unlawful, thus depriving the defend-
ant of notice of the nature of the offense charged.
(2) It failed to allege that Kilrain also had committed the offense,
but Sullivan's guilt was possible only if two persons were guilty. (It
Is submitted that the words "fight with Kilrain" of themselves amply
charged that Kilrain was the other offender, and that there was another
offender.)
(3) The dictionary definition made it doubtful whether prize fights
had to be in public to be unlawful, but the statute must have intended
to outlaw only public encounters, permitting private encounters
between amateurs or professionals, even though for a prize. The words
of the indictment included the later class of acts, so were too broad.
That the Mississippi court construction of the statute was
clearly wrong is shown by later decisions the country over, but
the Roxbury Strong Boy was free again.
18 Italics supplied.
1767 Miss. 346, 7 So. 275 (1890). A graphic account of the
Sullivan-Kilrain fight, last of the great bare fist encounters, appeared
In The American Mercury, Jan., 1938, p. 30.
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In 1893 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' s reversed a
$500 fine imposed on Sullivan for violation of an 1889 statute19
which required a $500 occupation tax of persons engaged in
prize-fighting. The court held that the statute of 1891,20
which made prize fighting a felony, impliedly repealed the
former statute. Sullivan's release was not unpopular, but the
attitude of the court seems inconsistent with the general prin-
ciple of liberal construction of tax statutes. 2 ' This is all the
more true when it is noted that the tax statute in question, clas-
sifying prize fights with bear-baiting and bull-fighting, and
also imposing $1,000 occupation taxes on fortune-tellers, etc.,
was primarily a preventive, rather than a revenue measure.
Al Capone's imprisonment at Alcatraz for income tax viola-
tions was not avoided by the fact that his income was from a
source prohibited by law. There is no report on any criminal
proceeding against Sullivan under the Texas prize fight
statute.2
2
"Sullivan v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 50, 22 S. W. 44 (1893).
29 Acts, 21st Leg., c. 32, p. 24, amending Rev. Stat. (1879), art. 4662.
20 Acts, 22d Leg., p. 54.
0 The fact that a business is declared unlawful by one statute does
not prevent the collection of a tax imposed upon such business by
another statute. An illegal act may be taxed. Cooley on Taxation(4th ed. 1924), ss. 1689; 37 C. J. 216, Licenses, ss. 71; United States
v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 80 L. Ed. 233, 56 S. Ct. 223 (1935); State
ex rel. Melton v. Rombach, 112 Miss. 737, 73 So. 731 (1917); (that a
statute taxing usury was not unenforceable because usury was made
unlawful by another statute); Foster v. Speed, 120 Tenn. 470, 111
S. W. 925 (1908); Stein v. Kentucky State Tax Commission, 266 Ky.
469, 99 S. W. (2d) 443 (1936). See also State et rel. Bonner v. Andrews,
131 Tenn. 554, 175 S. W. 563 (1915) in which a subsequent statute
prohibiting liquor sales was helc not to prevent enforcement of an
earlier statute taxing liquor sales. While some Texas cases exist that
are in accord with the Sullivan decision, in Barnes v. State, 75 Tex. Cr.
188, 170 S. W. 548 (1914), the same court is directly contra to its
Sullivan ruling and in accord with the Bonner v. Andrews rule.
22Two years after the court held that the 1891 statute prohibiting
prize fights repealed the 1889 statute taxing them, the prize fight
question arose again, this time in connection with the proposed
Corbet-Fitzsimmons bout. By a curious combination of errors, the
1889 statute was then held to have repealed the 1891 statute. On the
same day that the 1891 statute was enacted, a law was passed providing
for the revision of the civil and penal codes. In 1895 these revisions
were adopted. Either as the result of oversight, or because the revi-
sion committee deemed itself without authority to omit constructively
repealed statutes from the revision, the 1889 statute appeared in the
revised civil code. Since the revised penal code, containing the 1891
statute, was adopted four days before the revised civil code, the 1889
provisions became "subsequent" to the penal statute and were held to
repeal it. The outraged governor convened a special session of the
legislature which enacted a new penal statute declaring prize fights
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In 1893 the Michigan court reversed a conviction under
that state's statute, for failure of the trial court to instruct
that the offense could not be complete without both an expecta-
tion of a reward by the contestants and an intention to inflict
personal injury upon the opponent.23
In 1894 the Louisiana court reversed 24 the action of a
lower court in revoking the license of a club found guilty of
maintaining prize fights. Upon rehearing, a new trial was
granted because of error in admitting expert testimony as to
the difference between prize-fighting and boxing, since the
statute outlawed the act "commonly called a prize fight".25
In 1895 the court heard a second appeal in the same matter,
affirming an injunction restraining the club from further fight
activities, but not ordering a revocation of its character. 26
In latter years many courts resorted to the distinction between
"prize-fighting" and "boxing" attempted unsuccessfully in
the 1894 appeal, but the 1895 decision not only reaffirmed the
stand of the former holding, but declared the statutory exemp-
tion of "exhibitions and glove contests . . . within the
rooms of regularly chartered athletic clubs" void as being
entirely irrelevant. An Ohio decision of 1896 declared that
the statutory exemption of sparring contests or exhibitions in a
public gymnasium or arena, afforded no protection to a gym-
nasium holding encounters for which the contestants were to
receive a prize, or were attended by backers, referees and
umpires.27
In 1896 the Kansas Supreme Court reversed a conviction
under that state's fight statute in which the defendant had been
sentenced to one year in the penitentiary. The defendant had
appeared in a twenty-five round "boxing exhibition" under
the Marquis of Queensberry rules, using five ounce gloves, with
a referee officiating, and a $50 award paid to each contender.
to be felonies. No case arising under that statute has been reported
as yet, but if the Texas precedents are followed and a case Involving
it ever arises, it will be held inoperative and impliedly repealed by the
subsequent statute of 1933 which regulates "fistic encounters".
21 People v. Taylor, 96 Mich. 576, 56 N. W. 27 (1893).
"State v. Olympic Club, 46 La. Ann. 935, 15 So. 190 (1894).
0 Italics supplied.
* State v. Olympic Club, 47 La. Ann. 1095, 17 So. 599 (1895).
"In re Athletic Clubs, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 696 (1896), (in 40
Cent. Dig., col. 2496).
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The trial court had instructed that "prize fight" meant a fight
or physical contest between two persons for a prize or reward.
The appellate court deemed the instruction too broad, and re-
stricted the definition to cases where there was, an intent to use
violence for the purpose of inflicting injury. After thus restrict-
ing the statute and turning the defendant loose, the court sagely
held that a prize fight was still a prize fight even though the loser
as well as the winner was given a reward, since the statute was
aimed at preventing "that class of brutal exhibitions for which
money is paid the participants". 28
Although a selection of quotations from the reported New.
York cases, arranged chronologically, indicate an ever broaden-
ing definition of "prize-fighting" by those courts, the attendant
circumstances harmonizes those holdings with the premise of
changing conditions already stated. The original New York
statute outlawing prize fights was passed in 1856,29 but the
first reported case interpreting it came in 1889, reversing the
conviction of a fight promoter who had in New York arranged
a bout between two women boxers. The actual fight took place
in Canada, apparently in public, but the court viewed the facts
as showing the bout to be merely an exhibition to increase the
notoriety of one of the contestants, with no prize being offered
the winner, soft gloves being used, and no intention on the part
of either participant to injure the other.30 The court was
silent concerning whether admission fees had been charged the
spectators. It seems doubtful, however that the victim chosen
to face the defendant's fighter would permit herself to be used
as a "set up" for the other without pay.
In 1896 the legislature tried to adapt the statute to the
shift in public opinion by exempting from its operation spar-
ring exhibitions held in buildings owned or leased by athletic
associations, 31 but the amendment failed to stop the objection-
able practices, so was repealed in 1900.32 In People v.
Johnson,33 a decree was granted requiring the defendant to give
$100 bond that he would not violate the statute during the fol-
lowing year, but no other sanction was attempted. In 1903 a
Kansas v. Purtell, 56 Kans. 479, 43 Pac. 782 (1896).
C. 98.
,People v. Floss, 7 N. Y. Supp. 504 (1889).
'C. 37.
2C. 270.
"22 Misc. Rep. 150, 49 N. Y. Supp. 382 (1897).
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conviction under the statute was affirmed, but the facts dis-
closed an extreme case. The defendant promoter had leased a
barn for a "smoker", and had printed tickets reading,
"Smoker! Collier, Chissel. $1". Collier and Chissel fought, the
bout continuing until Chissel was knocked out. Then every-
body went into the barroom and had a free-for-all in which the
defendant lost his money and diamond pin.34
In 1911 the New York State Athletic Commission was
created, and given broad powers of control over professional
boxing. Contests licensed by the commission were exempted
from the operation of the statute, but failure to secure a license
made a person liable both under the original statute and under
a new section declaring it a misdemeanor to fight without a
license. 35
In Pitzsiimons v. The Commission)3 6 the court upheld the
power of the Commission to examine and reject prospective
fighters, declining to enjoin it from refusing the fifty-one year
old warrior a license for another bout. The opinion stated
that prize fighting was still a crime, but that boxing was per-
mitted by statute when properly licensed. The court apparent-
ly tried to treat "prize-fighting" and "boxing" as two quite
distinct activities, but the fictitiousness of the distinction is
apparent in the court's subsequent assertion:
"The profession of prize-fighting is an occupation subject to govern-
ment control".5
Later decisions have been principally concerned with the
boxing commission statute, rather than with the criminal stat-
ute. In People ex rel. Weiner v. Barr,38 a prosecution under
the prize fight act was upheld against habeas corpus, but the
offender was a stakeholder, and not a fighter. In McHugh. v.
Midrooney,39 it was held that amateur exhibitions did not
31People v. Finucan, 80 App. Div. 407, 80 N. Y. Supp. 929 (1903).
3Laws, 1911, c. 779.
3146 N. Y. Supp. 117 (1914), affirmed, 162 App. Div. 904, 147 N. Y.
Supp. 1111 (1914).
-7d., p. 120.
"People, ex rel., Weiner v. Barr, 223 App. Div. 310, 228 N. Y. Supp.
192 (1928), reversing order of 131 Misc. 80, 225 N. Y. Supp. 346 (1927).
"258 N. Y. 321, 179 N. D. 753 (1932), reversing 234 App. Div. 736,
252 N. Y. Supp. 965. Accord: Bridge City A. C. v. Salberg, 234 App.
Div. 309, 254 N. Y. Supp. 777 (1932). Contra: City Island Club v.
Mulrooney, 141 Misc. 733, 253 N. Y. Supp. 768 (1931). The court in
the McHugh case could easily have reached the opposite result but for
the fact that during its first ten years the commission had made no
attempt to control amateur fights.
KENTUCKY LAw JouRNA.L
require a license, even though an admission fee was charged.
This decision was followed by an amendment giving the boxing
commission control over amateur bouts in which admission fees
were charged.40
However popular the prize fight statute was in its early
days, the shift in public opinion made it unenforceable. Not
only did the opposition to the sport lessen, but its adherents
increased in number, so that the passive uninterest which had
enabled the statute to slumber in former years changed to
interest in the fighters and their craft. The attempt to adapt
the statute to changed conditions by exempting athletic club
exhibitions proved ineffective, so state licensing was adopted.
Such a regulatory statute is enforceable because:
(1) It does not unduly interfere with bouts conducted
with a measure of decorum and in accordance with reasonable
and humane rules.
(2) There has developed a realization of a need for regu-
lation, to avoid not only the elements formerly objectionable
(as some of them are no longer in disfavor) but also to insure
against "fixed" and collusive matches.
But for the licensing device, the penal statute would be a
virtual dead letter, except for occasionally prosecuting persons
notoriously guilty of acts which are considered very objection-
able.
Other states have met changed conditions with an exemp-
tion of "sparring contests",41 the establishment of a boxing
commission, 42 or similar legislative acts, but in some states the
prize fight statute remains unmodified. The state of Oklahoma
is a prime example of the latter class. In that state the statute
has existed since statehood and has neither been repealed nor
abrogated by any sort of licensing or regulatory act. Similar
OLaws 1933, c. 625, Calill'8 onsol. Stat. (1931-1935 Supp.),
pp. 777, 778.
" See Safro v. Lakofsky, 184 Minn. 336, 238 N. W. 641 (1931);
In re Athletic Clubs, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 696 (1896); State v. Olym-
pic Club, 47 La. Ann. 1095, 17 So. 599 (1895); State i. District Court,
66 Mont. 464, 185 Pac. 157 (1919).
I4Vernon's Tex. Stat. (1936), art. 614-1 (giving Commissioner of
Labor jurisdiction to regulate); Dela. Rev. Code (1935), art. 3898 and
c. 164; III. Rev. Stat. (1937), c. 10 4/5; Purdon, Penn. Stat. (1937),
tit. 4, as. 1-23.
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in its terms to the other early Acts, the statute begins with this
provision:
"Every person who engages in, encourages or promotes any ring
or prize fight, or any other premeditated fight or contention, whether
as principal, aid ... surgeon or otherwise, although no death or per-
sonal injury ensues, is guilty of a misdemeanor."'
The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals has considered
the statute only once. In Sampson v. State,44 the defendant
had been fined $100 for promoting a prize fight held in Okla-
homa City on May 15, 1917. The program included both pre-
liminary and final bouts, each of the contestants in the latter
receiving $100. Ten rounds were the maximum length, ref-
erees and timekeepers were in attendance, the fighters wore six
ounce gloves, and there was admittedly no display of inten-
tional brutality. In affirming the conviction the court in un-
mistakable terms held that the bouts constituted "prize fights"
within the meaning of the statute, and that the statute used the
term in the popular and not in a technical sense. Despite the
Sampson decision, devotees of the manly art continued to enjoy
their fights, although the term "boxing match" was often
applied to them in advertisements.
In 1923 an attorney general's opinion set up a distinction
between boxing and prize fights, somewhat similar to that set
out in People v. Shirley,45 but the Criminal Court has never
had occasion to pass on it again.
In 1930, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had occa-
sion to consider the meaning of the statute. In Teeters v.
Frost,46 that court affirmed a judgment in favor of the mother
of a boy who lost his life in a ring encounter sponsored by the
defendant as a regular part of a theater program. The facts
showed that the bouts were advertised as "athletic exhibitions"
and "amateur fights", the contestants wore gloves, dressed in
ring togs, fought six round matches, were attended by a referee
and timekeeper, and were given an equal amount of money-$1
apiece-regardless of the outcome. Waiving aside the defend-
ant's attempt to class the performance as a sparring exercise
or something else not covered by the statute, the court expressly
"Ok . ftat. (1931), s. 2427.
" 18 Okl. Cr. 191, 194 Pac. 279 (1921).
:72 Colo. 120, 210 Pac. 327 (1922).
"145 Okl. 273, 292 Pac. 356 (1930).
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followed the Sampson decision and held the encounters to be
prize fights. Moreover, the court placed the defendant's liabil-
ity upon the proposition that by instigating an illegal combat
he became civilly liable to the injured parties.
With these two decisions upholding the statute and apply-
ing it to sets of facts which are not materially different from
any one of the vast majority of present day fights, with the
statute still unrepealed, and with no provision having been
made for licensing or regulation in order to avoid the statute,
the present state of the law in Oklahoma seems clear; but public
prize fights and boxing matches are held throughout the state
with no apparent fear of the statute being called into use.
The customary rules are followed, the bouts are scheduled in
advance, advertised more or less extensively, charge whatever
admission fee the fighting talent will command and are other-
wise indistinguishable from that described in the Sampson
decision. The bouts are not only free from police interference
generally, but are well attended by peace officers and are
accorded adequate protection from disorderly spectators,
despite the Oklahoma statute expressly providing that any
policeman or other peace officer knowing that such a fight is
about to be held and wilfully failing to bring a complaint
thereon, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall forfeit his office. 47
On the whole, the matches are conducted with little dis-
order and in accordance with the generally accepted rules.
The programs put on by touring carnival groups occasionally
become so disorderly, or the tactics of their fighters so objec-
tionable to the local citizens that the show is closed by the local
officers. Otherwise, no need for official control is felt and no
attention is given the statute. If, as happened in the Teeter
case, a boy dies as the result of such a contest, civil recovery
against the management would still be probable, but the same
result would- obtain were the criminal statute repealed. If an
ambitious county attorney were to press for convictions and
obtain them in the lower court, it seems likely that the appellate
court would find adequate reasons for reversal. The use of the
words "or other . . . contention" in the statute provides
ample ground for an interpretation excluding boxing matches
of the type described, as not within the legislative prohibition.
41Oki. Stat. (1921), ss. 2431, 2432.
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Informnations of this type are likely to prove duplicitous, and
error might be found in either admitting or excluding expert
testimony, or improperly instructing as to the elements of the
offense. On the other hand there is considerable feeling against
animal fights, and the statute forbidding and punishing such
activities is fairly well enforced. 48
To summarize, although many cases are cited as asserting
the illegality of prize fights, in virtually every instance in the
last forty years in which a conviction was affirmed, the defend-
ant was either violating some other statute, or the fight was
accompanied by brawls or other disturbance.49
0 N. Stat. (1931), s. 1841.
*In two Colorado decisions, People v. Corbett, 72 Colo. 117, 209
Pac. 808 (1922), and People v. Shirley, 72 Colo. 120, 210 Pac. 327
(1922), the appellate court overruled instructions favoring the defend-
ants, but verdicts of acquittal had already been rendered in the lower
court. Moreover, the defendants had failed to secure a license as
prescribed by statute. The convictions in federal courts have usually
been for violation of the statute (18 U. S. C. A., s. 405) forbidding
interstate shipment of prize fight films. U. S. v. Wilson (D. C. W. Va.,
1928), 23 F. (2d) 112; Atlantic Enterprises v. Crawford (D. C. Ga.,
1928), 22 F. (2d) 834. This federal statute does not prohibit exhibi-
tions of prize fight films within a state, but only prohibits their inter-
state transportation. Noall v. Dickinson, 49 Idaho 706, 292 Pac. 219(1930). In Commonwealth v. Mack, 187 Mass. 441, 73 N. E. 534 (1905),
the defendant had tried to evade the licensing statute by pretending to
operate an athletic club, each spectator having to join the club before
seeing the fight and the cost of "membership" varying with the loca-
tion of the seat wanted. State v. Business Men's Athletic Club,
178 Mo. App. 548, 163 S. W. (901 (1914), was only a quo warranto pro-
ceeding to forfeit the organization charter. In Commonwealth v.
McGovern, 116 Ky. 212, 75 S. W. 261, 66 L. R. A. 280 (1903,), the court
enjoined Terry McGovern from holding a scheduled bout with Cor-
bett, but no criminal sanctions were involved. In several other cases
cited as upholding convictions under the fight statute, the question
before the court was only the sufficiency of the indictment which had
already been quashed. State v. Patten, 159 Ind. 248, 64 N. E. 850
(1902); State v. Gregory, 34 Del. 115, 143 Atl. 458 (1928) (one judge
dissenting). Of., Rev. Code (Del., 1935), c. 164 (permitting boxing
matches under state regulation). The other cases cited as upholding
the statute were civil cases in which such statements were bare dicta.
Typical of such cases are Willard v. Knoblauch (Tex. Civ. App., 1918),
206 S. W. 734, and Coliseum Athl. Assn. v. Dillon, 204 Mo. App. 504,
223 S. W. 955 (1920) (attachment proceedings). In addition to those
already mentioned, only two decisions actually contain affirmances of
convictions under the fight statutes. State v. District Court, 56 Mont.
464, 185 Pac. 157 (1919) ($50 fine was sole punishment assessed). In
Dane v. U. S. (App. D. C., 1927), 18 F. (2d) 811, certiorari denied, 275
U. S. 538, 72 L. Ed. 413, 48 S. Ct. 35, three persons had been indicted
under the federal prize fight statute applicable to the District of
Columbia. The actual fighters were acquitted but the ticket seller
was convicted and his conviction affirmed, the court holding him a
principal and therefore within the allegation of the indictment that
the three engaged in a fight.
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The English cases were similar in result to the American
decisions, but while a few of the later eases were concerned
with the difference between a prize fight and a lawful sparring
exhibition,50 and whether the encounter was a prize fight if
held in a private building,5 1 all of the cases were agreed that
prize fighting was illegal and that the contestants were guilty
of an offense, the most frequently arising question being that
of the liability of spectators and other noncombatants. In at
least four cases it was ruled that spectators were liable as aiders
and abettors. In view of a later decision overruling this doc-
trine, an examination of the earlier cases is in point.
In 1825, in Rex v. Billingkam,5 2 the court said:
"These fights are unlawful assemblies, and every one going to them
is guilty of an offense."
In that case, however, the police had tried to prevent the fight,
whereupon a defendant and some of the one thousand specta-
tors scuffled with them, precipitating a general riot. In the
1831 decision of Rex v. Perkins,53 the court said:
"If the defendants went out to see these men strike each other.
and were present when they did, they are . . . guilty of an asasult."
The evidence showed that the defendants had actively aided in
the fight, however.
In another 1831 decision, Rex v. Hargrave,54 the defend-
ant was convicted of aiding and abetting the offense of man-
slaughter, and sentenced to fourteen years' transportation. The
evidence is not clear as to what capacity the defendant filled, but
he was not one of the fighters. The court also held that although
all the spectators were guilty of the manslaughter as principals,
still they were not such accomplices as to require corroboration,
so the conviction based on their testimony alone was unobjec-
tionable.55 Needless to point out, this case arose from a fight
in which a fatality had occurred.
In Rex v. Murphy,5" decided in 1833, the court ruled that
being a mere spectator was sufficient to make the defendant
"Reg. v. Orton, 39 L. T. 292, 14 Cox, C. C. 226 (1878).
DReg. v. Young, 10 Cox, C. C. 371 (1866).
02 C. & P. 234, 172 Eng. Rep. Reprint 106 (1825).94 C. & P. 537, 172 Eng. Rep. Reprint 814 (1831).
545 C. & P. 170, 172 Eng. Rep. Reprint 925 (1831).
55Accord as to non-necessity of corroboration: Reg. v. Young,
10 Cox, C. C. 371 (1866).
"6 C. & P. 103, 172 Eng. Rep. Reprint 1164 (1833).
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guilty without any acts or words on his part, the only require-
ment being that he were not casually passing by, but had stayed
at the place of fighting. In that case, however, the defendant
was accused of acting as a second, and had sought to defend on
the ground of being merely a spectator. Moreover, one of the
combatants had been killed, and as the spectators had several
times burst the ropes and hit him with sticks, it was doubtful
whether the blows of the other fighter or the blows of the spec-
tators was the actual cause of the death.
The idea that a mere spectator was liable as aiding and
abetting the offense was partially supported by the fact that
paying spectators provided the money to be paid the con-
testants. The rule had been often applied in the cases of
duels,57 even subsequent to the time of the Murphy case, but
in Regina v. Coney,5 s the doctrine was repudiated, and the trial
court reversed for following the Murphy case. In overruling
"these obiter dicta" of the Murphy, Perkins, and Billingham
cases, the court insisted that for anyone to be liable as an abettor,
he must actually have gone there for the purpose of encouraging
it, not merely to see it. Admitting that presence alone was, some
evidence of encouragement, the majority of the court thought
that "to constitute an aider and abettor some active steps must
be taken by word or action, with the intent to instigate the
principal". A subsequent decision involving a different type
of offense has found this language inapplicable,59 but the Coney
decision is informative because it actually involved a person
who was only a spectator, one of 150 who had gathered to watch
the fight. No one was killed in the fight or as a result of it, so
far as the evidence shows, and while both of the contestants
were convicted, even the trial court had deemed Coney's offense
trivial, sentencing him to only three weeks imprisonment.6 0
"Reg. v. Young, 8 C. & P. 644, 173 Eng. Rep. Reprint 655 (1838);
Reg. v. Cuddy, 1 C. & K. 210, 174 Eng. Rep. Reprint 779 (1843).
& (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 534. Noted (1882), 15 Cent. L. J. 217 (reprinted
from 17 L. J. 322).
"Du Cros v. Lambourne (1907), 1 K. B. 40. The offense involved
was that of improper operation of an automobile. The judge said:
"Regina v. Coney was a case of spectators at a prize fight, and I do
not think the general language used . . .was intended to be, or can
be, treated as applying to every kind of case."
"Regina v. Hodkiss, decided in the same year as the Coney case
and cited in that case, espoused the same doctrine, although the facts
differed. Cf., 9 Halsbury's Laws (1st Ed.), p. 470; Wharton, Criminal
Law (11th Ed.), ss. 497, 49, 833.
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Regina v. Brown61 avoids this troublesome question by
convicting the spectator of failing to aid an officer in restoring
the peace, where one lone officer tried to stop the prize fight and
requested the defendant to help. The court turned a deaf ear
on the plea that the defendant was too busy holding his' horses
to help the officer. The evidence did show that the defendant
was atop his carriage, with horses hitched, so the excuse is more
plausible that the suggestion by the court in the Coney case that
the defendant might have been vainly trying to get away but was
held at the ringside by the pressure of the crowd. In addition
to being forty years prior to the Coney case, the Brown case
involved forcible resistance by the spectators to the uniformed
constable and his helpers who sought to stop the fight, bringing
the case within the observations already made concerning fights
coupled with riots.6 2
Seaward v. Paterson,3 decided in 1897, agreed with the
doctrine of the Coney case as to the liability of a mere spectator,
but found that the defendant in question had actively aided in
the commission of the offense. The evidence showed that a
twenty-five year lease of certain rooms had been made, the tenant
covenanting to use them for club purposes and not to permit any
noise or disturbance. When the tenant commenced holding
prize fights in the rooms, the lessor and other tenants secured an
injunction, for the breach of which the tenant and his employee
were convicted, the latter having acted as "master of cere-
monies" at the fights. The third defendant, although claiming
to be a mere spectator, appeared to be interested financially in
the venture.
Two other English cases, sometimes cited, in each of which
one contestant was killed, are not squarely in point. In one, the
deceased had goaded the defendant into the combat, while both
were at a dance, and the death resulted from a fall while wres-
tling, not boxing.64 In the other case, the fight, while pre-
arranuged, was likewise a grudge bout, the stakes being put up
by each fighter more to compel attendance, rather than as the
1 C. & M. 314, 174 Eng. Rep. Reprint 522 (1841).
1 See Reg. v. Hunt, 1 Cox. C. C. 177. (That a prize fight in the
presence of a quiet crowd which departed quietly upon the appear-
ance of officers, was not an affray.)
(1897) 1 Ch. 545.
"Reg. v. Lewis, 1 C. & K. 419, 174 Eng. Rep, Reprint 874 (1844).
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prize. The stakeholder, who was not present at the bout, and
whom the court thought unaware of the serious nature the
affair, assumed, was held not an accessory.6 5 The English
decisions, difficult of reconciliation from the standpoint of
legal doctrine in the different opinions, may nevertheless and
like the American cases, be reconciled from an analysis of the
actual fact situations presented, and the time and place in which
the prosecution arose. The English cases agreed that prize
fights were illegal, without any specific statute on the point, but
they too created a distinction between prize-fighting and box-
ing, despite the early opinions which used the words as synony-
mous.
If the English cases seem strangely to run toward convict-
ing spectators, whereas the American cases do not, the difference
is largely apparent. In most of the instances where conviction
resulted, the defendant was more than a "mere spectator",
either a backer, a second, or one who resisted police efforts to
stop the fight. Somewhat similar results were reached in Ameri-
can cases in which the conviction of a promoterO6 or a second 6T
was sustained. In neither country is there any material prob-
ability of a mere spectator at a large prize fight being prosecuted
for any serious offense, despite any contrary statute68 or court
doctrine.
The English and American cases, while not identical in
result, 9 are roughly parallel, similar enough to corroborate
the hypothesis of the importance of the dominant local culture
of the particular period, different enough to reflect the differ-
ences in the culture of two widely separated countries.
Lastly, concerning the legal problem of distinguishing
between prize fighting and boxing, it can be said that originally
there was no difference between the two. The statutes never
intended to cover bona fide sparring exercises, but were in-
"Reg. v. Taylor, Law Rep. 2 Crown Cases Reserved 147 (1875).
"People v. Floss, 7 N. Y. Supp. 504 (1889); Dane v. United States,
18 F. (2d) 811 (1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 538, 27 L. Ed. 413, 48 S.
Ct. 35 (1927). (Promoter was convicted although the fighters were
acquitted.)
4 Commonwealth v. Welsh, 73 Mass. 324 (1856).
"Pardon, Penn. St. (1937) 18:1781 (every person present is
guilty).
"It Is to be noted that more of the English decisions were
reported from inferior courts than in the case of the American
decisions.
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tended to cover ALL ring contests, whether or not admission
was charged, whether or not gloves were used (although most
of the statutes antedated the introduction of gloves for use in
the actual bouts, as distinguished from the practice sessions),
and despite the name used, the terms of the prize award, or the
nature of the ring used. Later, with the introduction of
humane rules, fair play, heavy gloves, and a limited number
and length of rounds, the courts found a distinction between
the two, a distinction which, under modern boxing commission
laws such as the New York statute, are completely abandoned
again. In a state whose latest revised statutes provide for com-
mission control of "boxing, sparring, and wrestling" and
penalties for unlicensed exhibitions, without mentioning "prize
fights" what chance that an offending pugilist could avoid the
penalty by pleading he was engaged in a prize fight, as distinct
from a boxing match? Again, the federal act of 1896 which
applied to the territories and the District of Columbia, forbid-
ding "pugilistic encounters" for a prize or championship, or
where admission was charged, 70 and which made the use or
non-use of gloves immaterial, 7' obviously covers "prize fights".
A 1929 amendment exempts Alaska and Hawaii from the act,
provided the contestants wear five ounce gloves, fight not more
than ten rounds of three minutes each and have previously been
examined and pronounced fit by a physician,72 all of which
regulation would describe the "boxing and sparring exhibi-
tions" of other statutes.
"Act. of Feb. 7, 1896, c. 12, s. 1, 29 Stat. 5.
Id., s. 2.
"Act of Feb. 8, 1929, c. 153, 45 Stat. 1156.
